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ARE WE REALLY FREE? A BIBLICALLY BASED
RESPONSE TO NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL
REDUCTIONISM1
Richard Rice
Loma Linda University
Loma Linda, California

“Whether I shall turn out to be the hero of my own life,” says Dickens’s
David Copperfield, “or whether that station will be held by anybody else,
these pages must show.” Are we the heroes of our own lives? Or are they
determined by something else? The more various sciences tell us about
human behavior today, the more they attribute what we do, and think, and
feel to factors outside our control. They seem to leave little room for anything
like a “soul” or “self ”—for the notion that we are not only physical beings in
a physical world, but to some extent self-determined.
According to one geneticist, the “specter of genetic determinism”
is “probably the source of more public concern than any other question
about human nature. Are we merely the product of our genes, directly
and indirectly? In what sense are we free to act and behave in ways that
result from our own choices?”2 Religion scholar Martin Marty agrees. “The
most urgent agenda item on the religion-and-science front,” he says, is
not cosmology or evolution, but “scientific understandings of the brain,
consciousness, will.” “Reduce humans to the chemistry of neuron firings
in the brain, and you have crossed a new line. The human is then ‘nothing
but’ this or that.”3
Instances of violent behavior give the question special urgency. After
the shootings at Virginia Tech in 2007, columnist David Brooks wondered
if the student responsible was really responsible. Was he in control
of his actions, or was he “like a cork bobbing on the currents of giant
forces: evolution, brain chemistry, stress and upbringing”? The question
applies to all of us. Is there anything to the qualities we typically associate
with authentic humanity—qualities that go beyond the mere capacity to
experience, to respond to stimuli, and include the abilities to reflect, decide,
act, and assume responsibility. Are human beings free and responsible,
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centers of consciousness and bearers of great value? Are we persons, selves,
in anything like the conventional sense of these terms? In other words, are
we really free?
Scientific Reductionism
For some people, the scientific study of human behavior provides a clear answer
to the question of freedom, and the answer is No. As they see it, neuroscience
demonstrates that humans are thoroughly embodied, and everything about
them is therefore determined. Not only is the mind inseparable from the
body, but everything there is to us, including all our mental activity, has a
physical explanation. What is often referred to as “folk psychology,” then,
the common-sense view that we are somehow distinct from our bodies, in
charge of our thoughts and actions at least to some extent, turns out to be a
mistake.
Philosopher Ted Honderich is one who believes that neuroscience
contains “more than enough clear hard facts” to settle the time-honored issue
of freedom and determinism. Mental events are intimately related to neural
events, and there are no gaps in the brain’s history. Every psychoneural pair
is the direct effect of a previous state of affairs, forming a continuous causal
stream that extends back beyond the first moment of consciousness. There is
nothing between these events, nor is there anything beyond them. Since our
minds consist entirely of neural events, he argues, there is no ongoing “self ”
or “person” who does the choosing, deciding, and acting. Indeed, the very
idea of such a thing is an “embarrassment.”4
Few state this position so starkly, but others, too, hold that mental states
are entirely reducible to brain states. Paul and Patricia Churchland, for example,
are advocates of “eliminative materialism.” Neuroscientific categories will
never explain our common-sense concept of the self, they argue, not just
because it is difficult to do, but because the very attempt to do so rests on
a mistake. From what neuroscience has already shown us, they maintain, we
can be confident that it will eventually demonstrate that there is no such thing
as the conventional notion of self, soul, or person,5 so we should abandon
the concept entirely. Along with now-discarded concepts like phlogiston and
crystalline spheres, the concept of the self is destined for elimination. The
time is coming when no one will believe in such a thing.6
Daniel Dennett takes another path to the same conclusion. To be
consistent, he argues, those who accept evolution as an explanation for the
4
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development of life on this planet should also accept the idea that every aspect
of life, including all of human life, has a material explanation. For Dennett,
“Darwin’s dangerous idea” is a “universal solvent,” and there is no limit to its
application, no “cut off ” point where evolutionary accounts end and human
qualities and characteristics begin. All our mental functions therefore have
physical explanations. The factors that account for every other aspect of
life’s history—descent with modification by means of natural selection—can
account for all the features of human life, including thought, decision, and
action. Darwinism thus dissolves “the illusion of our own authorship, our
own divine spark of creativity and understanding.”7
Invoking his favorite metaphor, Dennett argues that we should look
for “cranes” rather than “skyhooks” to explain human behavior, including
everything the word “mind” traditionally applies to. As he envisions the
Darwinian universe, there are no skyhooks, no miraculous lifters reaching
down from outside the system. Cranes do all the lifting, and they rest
firmly on the ground. Nothing contributes to the process that is not part
of the process; nothing stands outside the incremental accomplishments of
natural selection. “If we commit ourselves to Darwin’s ‘strange inversion
of reasoning,’” Dennett argues, “we [must] turn our backs on compelling
ideas that have been central to the philosophical tradition for centuries . . .
[including] Descartes’s res cogitans [thinking substance] as a causer outside the
mechanistic world.”8
As Dennett sees it, however, this doesn’t diminish the significance
of the mind, for the mind is not only produced by cranes, it is a powerful
crane itself, indeed, “the crane to end all cranes.”9 Equipped with habits and
methods, mind-tools and information, human brains are capable of complex
activity, and their enormous effectiveness surpasses every other form of life.10
Nevertheless, everything about us, including consciousness and free will, is
ultimately attributable to the process of physical transformation that Darwin
described. There is no feature of human life that cannot be accounted
for by the incremental advance of complex physical phenomena. Like the
Churchlands, Dennett concludes not only that we are not significantly free,
but that there is no “we” as we conventionally think of ourselves.
Whatever the evidence that supports determinism, something in us
deeply resists it. (Even Honderich admits that the idea gets him down). And
the problem with determinism seems to be precisely what Honderich and
7
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the Churchlands take to be its strength, namely, the fact that it eliminates the
notion of the self. Eliminate freedom, we cannot help but feel, and something
essential to our humanity goes out the window with it. As Gary Watson puts
it, “The problem of free will is . . . the problem of finding room in the
world for ourselves.” It is part of the “general difficulty in bringing together
our views of ourselves both as moral beings and as creatures of nature.” 11
The challenge that neurophysiological reductionism presents to us, therefore,
is whether we can account for both features that seem essential to human
experience: the fact that we are undeniably physical beings in a physical world
and the conviction that we are free and self-determined.
The Human in Christian Perspective
Materialistic, reductionistic views of the self not only arouse existential
resistance, they also contradict the deep-seated religious conviction that
human beings are unique among earth’s inhabitants. From the perspective of
Christianity, human beings belong to the natural order, but the characteristics
that distinguish them from other forms of life are not only differences in
degree but differences in kind, and they confer special abilities and special
dignity. As creatures in the image of God, humans reflect the personal qualities
of God’s own self; they reflect, decide, and act, and bear responsibility for
their decisions and actions.
There are different ways to account for human uniqueness. For centuries
the “default” explanation12 has been dualism—the idea that the true seat of
human identity is something nonphysical, an immaterial “mind” or “soul”
that somehow connects with the physical body, but is not dependent on it.
There is a long history of philosophical reflection on the soul thus conceived
and how it relates to the body. Dualism comes in Platonic, Thomistic, and
Cartesian varieties. And the idea has some staunch contemporary defenders
as well, including influential thinkers such as Richard Swinburne13 and J. P.
Moreland.14 But Seventh-day Adventists have never subscribed to the idea,
and it has become less and less acceptable to thoughtful Christians generally.
One important reason is the fact that the Bible fails to support anything
like an immaterial soul that supervenes upon or exists independently of
the body. The widespread consensus among biblical scholars today is that
dualism has no biblical support. The biblical words for “soul” apply to the
11
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human person as a whole, a totality, not to some immaterial substance that is
connected to the body during our lives and departs when we die. In the famous
words of H. Wheeler Robinson, “The Hebrew idea of the personality is an
animated body, not an incarnated soul.”15 More recent studies corroborate
Robinson’s view. In Body, Soul, and Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the
Bible, Joel B. Green draws his investigation to a close with the observation
that “our identity is formed and found in self-conscious relationality with its
neural correlates and embodied narrativity or formative histories. . . . [W]ho we
are, our personhood, is inextricably bound up in our physicality.” And death
is “the cessation of one’s body,” “the conclusion of bodily life, the severance
of all relationships, and the fading of personal narrative.” This means that,
at death, the person really dies.” “[T]here is no part of us, no aspect of our
personhood, that survives death.”16
For Seventh-day Adventists, the Bible will always be the first and last
court of appeal in matters of ultimate significance. But since we believe
that nature and revelation ultimately agree, we also take seriously evidence
that comes from other sources. It is not insignificant, therefore, that both
scientific discovery and philosophical reflection provide reasons for affirming
the uniqueness of human experience and the irreducible value of human
existence.
Green’s study of human nature is particularly interesting because it
combines a careful analysis of biblical anthropology with a close look at
contemporary neuroscience. This dual approach firmly closes the door to
dualistic accounts of human uniqueness, but it opens the door to another.
Although contemporary neuroscience anchors consciousness firmly within
the physical structure and function of the brain, it also provides ways to
account for human uniqueness.
The Evidence of Neuroscience
The more contemporary neuroscience discovers about the mind, the more
apparent it is that mind and body—that mind and brain, to be specific—
are inextricably connected. Thanks in large measure to their study of
brain damage and degeneration victims, scientists have determined that
psychological capacities are directly associated with particular locations in the
brain. Depending on which area of the brain is involved, “very specific losses
in the victim’s psychological capacities typically result.” They may lose the
15
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ability to perceive colors, to recognize faces, comprehend speech, or lay down
new memories.17
On the more positive side, “Specific types of cognition—perceptions,
memories, emotions—do correlate with specific state changes in specific brain
regions.”18 Studies of the prefrontal cortex of humans and monkeys through
the use of electrodes and PET scanning have shown that specific areas of
the brain are stimulated when certain mental activities occur. And the study
of corticospinal excitability through the use of focal, single-pulse transcranial
magnetic stimulation applied to the scalp indicates that various moods, the
presence of sad or happy thoughts, are related to different hemispheres of
the brain.19 The list goes on, but the conclusion is clear. The human mind,
with all its capacities, is inextricably connected to the brain. As Philip Clayton
puts it, “There is no point in hiding one’s head in the sands of a prescientific
age that denied the dependence of the mental on the physical.”20
With dualism no longer an option, those who wish to maintain anything
like the Christian affirmation of human uniqueness must find another
alternative to reductionistic materialism. And in recent years a number of
scholars have been doing exactly that, especially those who identify their
position as “non-reductive physicalism.” Contra dualism, they assert, we are
fully material: there is nothing about us that is not involved in the physical
world. Contra reductionism, however, we are not merely material: there is
more to human existence than physical processes can fully account for. Even
though the distinctive features of human cognition are connected to the
physical, they are somehow distinguishable from them.
From this perspective, biology and neuroscience are indispensable to
our knowledge of the human, but they do not explain everything about us.
When a brain exhibits the level of neurological complexity found in humans,
these scholars argue, it supports a distinctive type of mental behavior. New
qualities develop. Through self-awareness and self-transcendence a human
being becomes self-directing, or free, in ways that reductionism cannot
adequately account for. Among the scholars who have contributed to this
perspective, Nancey Murphy and Clayton are especially well-known. Central
to their account of human uniqueness are concepts like “supervenience,”
“emergence,” and “downward causation.”
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Reductionism implies that there is only one sort of causation, namely,
bottom-up causation. The behavior of wholes can be explained entirely by
the behavior of their parts, and every feature of an organism can be attributed
to lower level factors. A careful analysis of the distinctive qualities of human
mentality, however, does not support this explanation. Although there is
nothing in human experience that does not depend on more simple forms of
life, complex wholes exhibit qualities that cannot be explained by the laws that
govern the behavior of their parts.21 Consequently, bottom-up causation will
not suffice; we need top-down causation, too.
Organisms from a single cell on up have the capacity of self-direction.
They use information to evaluate their actions and adjust them “when
feedback from the environment indicates a mismatch between the behavioral
routine and their goals.”22 The more complex the organism, of course, the
greater the degree of flexibility; it is much greater in mammals than in insects,
for example. But on the level of human cognition something appears that we
find nowhere else. Here we find the capacity to make our own behavior, our
own cognitive strategy, the object of attention and evaluation.
Like all organisms, humans represent a “goal-seeking system,” but they
also have a “supervisory system” that monitors and evaluates how the system
as a whole is behaving.23 They can evaluate their evaluations, and adjust their
behavior accordingly. This explains why human beings need a concept of the
self. In order to engage in the distinctly human activity of evaluating one’s
own behavior, we need to distinguish between the self and the other, the nonself. And we need a “theory of mind,” too, that is, the recognition that there
are others who have thoughts and feelings as well as bodies.24
In spite of the fact that our cognitive activities have a neural basis, then,
the laws of neurobiology do not account for all our activities. Our complex
neural mechanism makes it possible for us to objectify ourselves and our
behavior in light of certain standards or expectations, and to adjust our
behavior in response. But since these higher-level evaluative processes alter
neural structure, these abstract goals become “causal factors in their own
right.”25 There is thus a dimension of human existence that is inextricably
connected to our physical components, but cannot be reduced to them.
As Murphy uses the expression, “supervenience” conveys the idea that
mental operations are dependent on physical ones—there would be no mind or
21
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“soul” without the brain—but are not reducible to them.26 This is particularly
true of “higher-level mental events, such as deciding, judging, reasoning.”27
The qualities that make us uniquely human thus exert an influence on the
physical aspects of human existence. So, the physical provides an essential
basis for the mental, and the mental exerts a transforming influence on the
physical. Moral deliberation nicely illustrates the phenomenon. Moral reasons,
Murphy observes, “can have top-down efficacy despite the presumed causal
closure at the neurobiological level.” For example, we can subject to moral
supervision the fight-or-flight response that kicks in when we find ourselves in
a threatening situation. Doing so may lead us to seek a nonviolent resolution
of the conflict.28
Clayton employs the notion of “emergentist supervenience” as a way
of conceptualizing the complex connections between the physical and the
mental in human experience.29 This concept underscores the fact that the
brain is essential to all mental life. Neurological complexities make possible
complex mental experience. At the same time, it acknowledges that there are
aspects of human mentality that do not reduce to physical phenomena. There
is “something more” to human life than neuroscience alone can account for.
Not because neuroscientific accounts are deficient, but because they are
insufficient—because “there are parts of what it is to be a person that lie in
principle beyond their reach.”30
In addition, “emergentist supervenience” points to the interaction
between the physical and the irreducibly mental aspects of our experience.
As Clayton describes it, the “causal line” moves from the physical inputs and
the environment to the mental level, then along the line of mental causation,
with one thought influencing another, and finally down again to influence
other physical actions, to make new records and synaptic connections within
the brain. Consequently, there is only one physical system—the mind is not a
spiritual substance outside it—but higher level phenomena exercise a causal
influence on the system as a whole.31
Emergent supervenience thus provides us with a “science” of the person
of which neuroscience is one, but only one, contributing part.32 It affirms that
26
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mental phenomena depend on physical phenomena, but it also points to the
fact that mental experience alters the behavior and structure of the brain. So
it denies “the reducibility of the mental to the physical.”33
For non-reductionists such as Murphy and Clayton, then, human mental
behavior exhibits qualities that neuroscientific explanations alone could never
account for. We may share physical, social, and emotional characteristics with
other forms of life on this planet. And we may be embodied in physical
forms as they are, dependent on the external and internal physical resources
that make life on any level possible. But our complex mental activities make
us unique among all living things and distinguish our minds from our bodies,
inseparable though they are. And these features provide a basis for affirming
the person, or the self, as a reality with its own integrity as well as unique
responsibilities and dignity. They support the notion that we ourselves, not
our bodies, brains, or neurons, are the authors of our actions.34 To answer
David Copperfield’s question, we are indeed the heroes of our own lives.
The Evidence of Philosophy
Besides the important discoveries of neuroscience, there is evidence of
another sort that supports the biblical affirmation of human uniqueness,
evidence that is philosophical rather than empirical in nature.
Suppose we make a basic philosophical move and think about thinking,
or reflect on the activity of reflection. In fact, let’s reflect on the work we
just reviewed by both reductionists and non-reductionists on human mental
life. It seems clear that participants on both sides of the issue share a basic
assumption, whether they endorse reductive or non-reductive accounts of the
person. And the assumption is this: the human mind has the ability to arrive
at knowledge. Otherwise, what point would there be in conducting research,
drawing conclusions, and formulating arguments? Once we are clear about
this basic feature of our thought, the question as to which interpretation of
the human mind is more adequate—reductionist or non-reductionist—takes
a different form. For at this point, the question is not, which interpretation
of the neuroscientific data is preferable, but which concept of the mind—
reductionist or non-reductionist—better accounts for this fundamental
epistemic or cognitive confidence?
When the issue is posed this way, the advantage clearly goes to the nonreductionist. Reductionistic materialism not only threatens any concept of the
self, it calls into question the very possibility of knowledge. The very claim
to know something affirms one’s capacity to know, and this obviously entails
the existence of the knowing self. Whenever a person examines evidence and
draws conclusions, she implicitly affirms herself as the agent who does so,
Ibid., 199.
Murphy, Bodies and Souls, 109.
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and this is true even when she insists that there is no such thing as agency!
Paradoxically, the very act of denying the self presupposes the existence of
the self who makes this denial.
Self-referential objections to determinism are well-known, of course. As
J. R. Lucas puts it, determinism “cannot be true, because if it was, we should
not take the determinists’ arguments as being really arguments, but as being
only conditioned reflexes. . . . Only a free agent can be a rational one.”35 John
Eccles uses more colorful language. Determinists, he says, “have sawn off the
‘rational’ branch on which they like to think they are sitting. How long can this
levitational delusion be perpetuated by wishful thinking?”36
For her part, Murphy exclaims, “If reductionism were true, no rational
person could accept it because there would be no rational persons!”37 In other
words, if the human mind is what reductionists say it is, we would have no
reason to be reductionists, for in that case our thoughts are physical events
and nothing more.38
This self-referential argument assumes a more sophisticated form in
what is generally described as “transcendental philosophy.” According to
a dictionary definition, transcendental philosophy examines “the a priori
conditions of knowledge, which precede all experience of objects and which
are the primary constituents of all objects of knowledge and hence make
knowledge possible.”39 Transcendental philosophers explore the foundations
of knowledge as such, both scientific and philosophical, and they hold that
no account of knowledge will do unless it takes into account “the thinker’s
J. R. Lucas, Freedom of the Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), see §
“The Presupposition of Thought;” cited in John C. Eccles, The Human Psyche (Berlin:
Springer International, 1980), 242.
36
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the same time, Eccles, 242, insists that “all materialist theories of the mind ultimately
are reducible to determinism.” This obviously puts him at odds with the conclusions
of the nonreductive materialists we have mentioned.
37
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own act of knowing.”40 Dispense with the knower and you have eliminated
any basis for knowledge, any confidence in what the knower claims to know.
In eliminating the self, reductionist materialists have eliminated any basis
for confidence in their theory. Put succinctly, reductionism eliminates the
reductionist. Or, to turn it around, the activity of reductionists refutes the
theory of reductionism.
No one has pursued issues of this sort more extensively than philosopher
Bernard Lonergan. In his most celebrated work, Lonergan undertakes a
meticulous examination of human knowing in all its complexity. When we
review all the operations in which the human mind engages, he argues, from
sensing and perceiving, through inquiring and understanding, to reflecting
and affirming, we find that all of them involve the self-affirmation of the
knower.41
It is important to notice just how this self-knowledge is acquired. It is not
achieved via a process of direct introspection of the sort that, for instance,
H. D. Lewis invokes in The Elusive Mind. For Lewis, “mental processes are
of a quite different nature from physical ones or any observable external
reality.” They “belong to an entity distinct from one’s body and also from
any particular feature in the course of our experiences.”42 For Lewis, then, we
have the self on the one hand and the self ’s experiences on the other.
For Lonergan things are quite different. The self as he conceives it is
not an entity apart from, or distinct from, one’s experiences, but the self
inextricably involved in all one’s cognitive operations. “In Lonergan’s method
of introspection,” notes Tracy, “one is not trying to ‘move within’ to capture
some sudden, illuminating, confrontational and apparently spatial ‘look’ at the
self-being-conscious-to-the-self.” What is important for Lonergan is not the
“looked-at,” but the “looker,” that is, the inquirer as conscious—empirically,
intelligently, rationally, and existentially.43 The “I” that derives its meaning
from consciousness is “neither the multiplicity nor the diversity of contents
and conscious acts but rather the unity that goes along with them.”44

Ibid., 1745.
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From this careful analysis of consciousness, important conclusions
follow. If I ask if I am a knower, and reflect on what is involved in knowing,
“the fact of the asking and the possibility of the answering are themselves the
sufficient reason for the affirmative answer.”45 Self-affirmation, therefore, is
not a logical conclusion from prior premises, but the “explicitation” of what
is already at work in the concrete activities of knowing.46 Lonergan has a high
estimate of such self-affirmation. It “can provide a secure and personally
verifiable guide to all methodical and scientific activity,” he says.47 But most
important for our purpose, he argues that such self-affirmation is unavoidable
for anyone making cognitive claims, skeptics included.
To use Lonergan’s expression, it gives factual self-affirmation the quality
of necessity. “Am I a knower? The answer, Yes, is coherent, for if I am a
knower, I can know that fact. But the answer, No, is incoherent, for if I
am not a knower, how could the question be raised and answered by me?”
Moreover, the answer, “I do not know,” is equally incoherent. “For if I know
that I do not know, then I am a knower; and if I do not know that I do not
know, then I should not answer.”48 Any claim to knowledge, according to this
line of reasoning, implicitly affirms the self as knower. The talking skeptic is
thus mired in contradiction.49
The Evidence of Personal Courage
To deny the reality of the self as eliminative materialists do not only flies in
the face of neuroscientific and philosophical evidence, it also comes at great
personal cost. It would require us to deny qualities that are both essential to
human existence and universally admired.
Ibid.
Cf. Tracy, 100-101.
47
Tracy, 103.
48
Lonergan, 329.
49
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We began by noting that questions about freedom have immense practical,
or personal, importance, so it makes sense as we consider them to consult the
larger scale of human experience. And here, too—or here especially—we find
important reasons to affirm human beings as selves, souls, or persons who
are self-conscious and to some degree self-determined. Consider the cases of
people such as Gerald Sittser and Victor Frankl. Sittser lost his mother, his
wife, and one of his children in a horrible traffic accident. Frankl is a holocaust
survivor. The reactions of these two men to their experiences are strikingly
similar. Though they were victimized by forces beyond their control, though
their freedom was severely restricted, we might say, they discovered that they
were free nevertheless. They were free to respond to their situation, and they
found enormous significance in their capacity to respond.
Frankl asks, “Is the theory true which would have us believe that man
is no more than a product of many conditional and environmental factors—
be they of a biological, psychological or sociological nature? Is man but an
accidental product of these?” “We can answer these questions from experience
as well as on principle. The experiences of camp life show that man does
have a choice of action.” “Man can preserve a vestige of spiritual freedom,
of independence of mind, even in such terrible conditions of psychic and
physical stress.” “We who lived in concentration camps can remember the
men who walked through the huts comforting others, giving away their last
piece of bread. . . . [T]hey offer sufficient proof that everything can be taken
from a man but one thing: the last of the human freedoms—to choose one’s
attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one’s own way.”50 “It is
this spiritual freedom . . . that makes life meaningful and purposeful.”51
Sittser makes similar observations. “There is little we can do to protect
ourselves from these losses,” he notes. “There is much we can do, however,
to determine how to respond to them. We do not always have the freedom
to choose the roles we must play in life, but we can choose how we are going
to play the roles we have been given.”52 Though not couched in scientific
or philosophical terminology, these insights nonetheless bear on the subject
of this discussion. The loss of freedom often leads people to appreciate
how important freedom and self-determination are. And, paradoxically, the
discovery that one’s freedom is limited is itself an act of freedom.
To conclude, neuroscientific data and philosophical reflection provide
support for the biblical concept of the self as free and self-determined.
50
Victor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, rev. ed. (New York: Washington Square
Press, 1985), 86.
51
Ibid., 87.
52
Gerald Sittser, Grace Disguised: How the Soul Grows Through Loss (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1996), 37.
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Despite interpretations to the contrary, neuroscience leads many to conclude
that mental states are not reducible to brain states, that human beings are
self-directing and therefore significantly free. And even when people
conclude from scientific data that we are not free, the very act of drawing this
conclusion testifies that we are. Furthermore, our natural admiration for those
who face great challenges courageously, and rise above tragic circumstances,
adds intuitive evidence for the conviction that freedom as both a concept
and a value is something we cannot live without. The biblical affirmation
that human beings are both creatures and bearers of God’s image—that they
are finite, physical, and free—finds corroborating evidence in an impressive
variety of sources.

